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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

The court determined that,
"Act-of-God" to produce damages.
although the hurricane was an Act-of-God, PG Energy's negligence was
a substantial factor causing the resulting damage.
Finally, the court considered PG Energy's argument that the trial
court abused its discretion in accepting the Shamnoskis' testimony
regarding the value of the lost property that resulted in an
inappropriate damages calculation, especially with respect to delay
damages. The court recognized the Shamnoskis' damages occurred
fifteen years before the date of the appeal and the record did indicate
many periods of inactivity. The court declined to decide whether the
trial court's calculation of delay damages was appropriate, but
remanded the case with directions that the trial court provide the
superior court with an explanation of its method for calculating the
damages awarded.
Megan Becher-Harris
RHODE ISLAND
R&R Assocs. v. City of Providence Water Supply Bd., 765 A.2d 432
(RI. 2001) (holding the City of Providence ("City") neither effected a
defacto condemnation of mill owners water rights, nor breached the
contract between the mill owners and the City regarding
condemnation compensation when the City supplied water to
communities not mentioned in the statute establishing the Scituate
Reservoir).
In 1915, the Rhode Island General Assembly enacted a statute
("Act") enabling the City of Providence Water Supply Board ("City") to
condemn lands and water in and around the north branch of the
Pawtuxet River to establish the Scituate Reservoir ("Reservoir"). The
Act specified the City and other named municipalities could receive
water from the Reservoir. Over the years, the General Assembly
amended the Act many times to allow additional communities to
receive water from the Reservoir.
In 1922, the City contracted with mills that abutted the north
branch of the Pawtuxet River downstream from the Reservoir, to
compensate them for the taking their riparian rights through the Act.
The contract specified that under section 6 of the Act, the City could
not impair the mills' residual water rights, and that all rights enjoyed
by the mills under the Act would remain in force.
The superior court certified R&R Associates, L&L Associates, and
Robert LaFerriere (collectively, "R&R") to represent a class that
constituted the successors in interest to the mills. In 1996, R&R filed
suit arguing that by allowing additional communities to use the
Reservoir over the years, the City had breached the contract and taken
their residual water and property rights without just compensation.
R&R argued the language in both the Act and the contract gave them
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water rights in addition to the original water rights the City had
condemned and compensated them for in 1922. Thus, R&R argued
they were entitled to compensation for the taking of these additional
water rights.
The trial court found the City's sale of water to additional
communities did not affect an uncompensated taking or breach of the
contract. First, the court found the language of the Act did not create
additional water rights in the mills. Rather, the Act specifically gave
the City an "open-ended right" to supply water to communities not
mentioned in the Act and required only that the City maintain
minimum water levels for the downstream mills. Second, the court
examined the condemnation documents and the contract, which
together demonstrated the City took all the water rights along the
Pawtuxet River leaving R&R the enjoyment of a minimum-flow of
water. The court found the City had not breached the contract
because R&R did not allege the City had failed to comply with the
minimum-flow requirements.
On appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, R&R argued the
trial court misinterpreted the Act and the contract. R&R argued that
the contract provisions, which required the City to discharge water
into the north branch and maintain minimum quantities of water in
the north branch for the mills, created residual water rights in the
mills. Thus, R&R argued a defacto condemnation of their water rights
occurred each time the City sold water to communities not listed in
the Act, because the City was required to discharge any unused water
into the north branch for R&R's use. In addition, R&R argued the
City breached the contract by selling water to communities not named
in the Act.
The City argued the condemnation documents and contract's
"Statement of Taking" indicated the City took all water rights
associated with the north branch of the Pawtuxet River, subject only to
the minimum-flow requirements. The City argued the contract
neither created new water rights nor altered R&R's existing water
rights. Thus, the City argued that because R&R had no proprietary
rights to the water, the City did not effect a de facto condemnation
when it sold water to additional communities. The City also argued
the use of the words "hereafter supplied" and "elsewhere" in the Act
allowed the City to sell water to communities not listed in the Act.
Finally, the City cross-appealed challenging the decision of the trial
court to exclude certain extrinsic evidence to show the parties' intent
concerning the condemnation process and the contract.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court examined the relevant sections
of the Act and the contract and determined the trial court had
correctly determined the meaning of the contested sections. Thus, the
court held the Act and the contract created no additional water rights
in R&R and required only that the City maintain the specified
minimum-flow on the Pawtuxet River for the mill owners. In addition,
the court agreed the Act's language allowed the City to supply water to
communities not named in the Act. Thus, because R&R was entitled
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only to the benefit of the minimum-flow and did not retain any
proprietary rights in the water, the City did not violate the Act or the
contract when it supplied water to communities not named in the
documents.
Thus, the court denied R&R's appeal and affirmed the trial court.
Therefore, the court did not rule on the City's cross-appeal.
JulieE. Hultgren
TENNESSEE
The Pointe, L.L.C. v. Lake Mgmt. Ass'n, No. W2000-0021 1-COA-R3CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 771 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2000)
(finding a lake owner's conveyance of property with appurtenances
and adjacent to a lake included the right to use the water).
Lakewood Development Corp. ("LDC") owned both man-made
Garner Lake ("Lake") and its adjacent land. The purpose of the
Lake's creation was to develop the surrounding land into lakeside
LDC conveyed the land underneath the lake to Lake
homes.
Management Ass'n ("LMA"). Likewise, LDC conveyed the adjacent
land to two individuals, who later formed The Pointe, L.L.C. ("The
Pointe"), in order to develop the property. The Pointe's deed
included "all the appurtenances and hereditaments thereunto."
LMA sought to impose restrictions and fees on adjacent
landowners. In response, The Pointe filed a declarative action to
determine whether it could access and use the Lake without paying
fees to LMA. LMA responded with a motion for summary judgment.
The trial court granted LMA's summary judgment motion. The Pointe
appealed.
To determine the propriety of summary judgment, the Court of
Appeals of Tennessee first determined whether the deed's language
entitled The Pointe to unrestricted use and enjoyment of the Lake.
The court found The Pointe's three theories for its legal right to
unrestricted use-appurtenances, riparian rights, and implied
easements-were related. The three theories described methods
through which a property owner may use something to enhance the
enjoyment of the property. The court determined The Pointe
acquired the right to use freely the Lake as an appurtenance to the
riparian property it owned. Further, the right was in the form of an
implied easement.
The court determined the appurtenance within the deed included
the right to use the Lake. The court recognized that an appurtenance
in a deed is meant to enhance the property. The riparian land's
inherent value arose from its proximity and accessibility to the water.
Furthermore, when a grantor conveys property adjacent to water, a
court presumes the right to use and enjoy water accompanies the

